Precision under pressure.

Because you cannot migrate what you cannot see. Public-key cryptography sits in TLS, VPNs, code signing, certificate authorities, databases, libraries, firmware, and vendor products, and most enterprises have never mapped it end to end. A current inventory, often called a cryptographic bill of materials, records which algorithms and key lengths run where, who owns them, and how long the protected data must stay confidential. That inventory is what turns post-quantum cryptography from a vague threat into a sequenced program. Shuriken Cyber starts every quantum engagement there.

A cryptographically relevant quantum computer running Shor's algorithm would break the public-key algorithms most systems rely on today: RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography such as ECDSA, EdDSA, and ECDH, and finite-field Diffie-Hellman. Those protect key exchange and digital signatures. Symmetric ciphers such as AES and hash functions such as SHA-2 are weakened far less and remain usable at adequate key and output sizes, such as AES-256. The practical task is to find every place a quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm is used, rank those systems by data lifetime and exposure, and plan their replacement.

Plan now. The standards are final and the timeline is taking shape. NIST finalized its first post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). NIST's draft transition plan, IR 8547, proposes deprecating 112-bit RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms after 2030 and disallowing quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2035. Data harvested today can be decrypted later, so long-lived secrets are already exposed. A funded 24-month roadmap that covers inventory, crypto agility, vendor upgrades, and priority systems is what lets a CISO defend the plan to a board.

Decisions, not physics. A useful briefing tells directors how much of the business relies on quantum-vulnerable cryptography, which data must stay confidential beyond the 2030s, what the published standards and timelines require, which vendors are on track, and what the roadmap costs and when. It should end with the decisions in front of the board: risk appetite, funding, and oversight cadence. If the board has not had one in the last 12 months, its view of the horizon is out of date. Shuriken Cyber builds briefing kits written in the language of residual risk and fiduciary duty.

Much of your cryptography lives in products you buy, so your roadmap depends on theirs. Ask critical vendors to disclose which algorithms their products use for key exchange and signatures, whether those can be swapped through configuration or updates, which NIST post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) they support or plan to support, and on what dates. Ask for a cryptographic bill of materials where possible, and write those disclosures into contracts and renewals. Vendors that cannot answer are a migration risk that belongs in your plan.